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Shifting Sands: An Analysis of OPEC Under U.S.
Antitrust and EU Competition Law and How the U.S.
Oil Boom Might Change It All
Christopher J. Lento∗
INTRODUCTION
“Coordination and unification of policy”; “Stabilization of the
markets”; “Ensuring an efficient and regular market supply”; “Fair
returns for investors in industry.”1 These admirable goals of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) seem
equally likely to appear within the various mission statements of
governmental agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission, or the EU
Commission on Competition Law. However, they encapsulate the
purported mission statement of an organization that is
unquestionably illegal under both EU and U.S. law, an organization
that commentators and experts have called “arsonists” of the global
economy2 and “snake-oil salesmen.”3
In September of 1960, OPEC was founded in Baghdad by five
signatory nations: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.4
Although OPEC currently has 12 Member Nations, membership has
fluctuated over the years and has included countries such as Qatar,
Indonesia, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador,
Angola, and Gabon, many of which have maintained continuous
membership, while others have suspended their membership for
periods of time depending upon internal political circumstances.5
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1. Our Mission, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES
[hereinafter OPEC], http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm [http:
//perma.cc/EF8Z-QE3K] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
2. Gal Luft, How to Ruin OPEC’s Birthday, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 9,
2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/09/how_to_ruin_opecs_bir
thday [http://perma.cc/65YV-XTAV] (archived May 13, 2014.)
3. Jerry Taylor, Left, Right and Wrong on Energy, WASH. POST, Aug. 14,
2000, at A21.
4. OPEC, OPEC Statute 2012, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.opec
org/opec_web/static_files_project/mediadownloads/publications/OPEC_Statute.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V5HD-CQFH] (archived Mar. 15, 2014).
5. Opec: The oil cartel in profile, BBC NEWS (May 29, 2008, 10:39 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3768971.stm [http://perma.cc/L844-HNUL]
(archived Feb. 16, 2014).
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The OPEC Statute differentiates between the original five
signatory countries, known as “Founder Members,” and countries
that joined after the formation, which are known as “Full
Members.”6 The Statute allows new countries to join OPEC as Full
Members if accepted by a majority of three-fourths of Full
Members, including the concurring votes of all five Founding
Members.7 The Statute stipulates that “any country with a
substantial net export of crude petroleum, which has fundamentally
similar interests to those of Member Nations, may become a Full
Member of the Organization,” provided that the voting requirements
are met.8 Member Nations refer to OPEC as an “intergovernmental
organization” with the goal of protecting the interests of the
producing nations.9
However, in an oligopolistic market such as the oil market,
where the number of producers is limited and the actions of any one
producer may affect the entire market; OPEC’s efforts to protect the
interests of its Member Nations offer a glimpse of its true nature.
The organization’s ongoing agreement to regulate production in
order to control international oil markets and its stated purpose of
stabilizing both prices and supply for the financial gain of its
members bring to light that OPEC is nothing more than a cartel on a
macro-level. Because the organization’s sole operations seem to
consist of manipulating markets, restricting output, and fixing
prices, the categorization of OPEC as a cartel has never been
seriously questioned. Although its methods are unquestionably
illegal, both U.S. and EU competition authorities have historically
avoided measures that would be taken as a matter of course in the
face of similar domestic, foreign corporate, or EU Member State
violations.10
In Part I, this Article will examine antitrust violations by OPEC
under both U.S. and EU competition regimes. Then, in Part II, the
Article will proceed to analyze some of the problems with asserting
antitrust jurisdiction over OPEC in its role as a “sovereign state” and
the differing paths taken by U.S. and EU authorities in dealing with
OPEC, while viewing the organization as a necessary evil. Finally,
recent advances in technology that have triggered an “oil boom” in
North America will be examined in light of their effect on oil
6. OPEC, supra note 4, at 3.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. OPEC, supra note 4, at 1.
10. See Solutions to Competitive Problems in the Oil Industry: Hearing
Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 34–39 (2000) [hereinafter
Solutions] (statement of Richard G. Parker, Director, Federal Trade Commission
Bureau of Competition).
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imports in Part III, and the Article will discuss how these advances
may affect OPEC’s ability to manipulate the global oil market.
I. CLASSIFICATION OF OPEC AS A CARTEL UNDER U.S. AND EU
COMPETITION LAW
The classification of a “cartel,” as it is commonly used, refers to
a formal organization of normally competing producers or
manufacturers that formally or explicitly agree to engage in
anticompetitive behaviors, such as fixing prices, limiting output,
division of profits, or allocation of market share, customers, or
territories.11 Whereas the underlying goal of competition authorities
on a global scale is preservation of competitive forces within free
and uninhibited markets, the behavior of cartels are distinguishable
from lawfully competitive behavior among businesses. While
antitrust law does not condemn businesses gaining market
dominance through “superior skill, foresight and industry,”12
authorities rigorously seek to proscribe formal agreements that result
in collusive outcomes affecting both allocation of market production
and pricing inequity. Since participating members rely on an agreed
course of action, these agreements typically have the effect of
eliminating competition within a specific market, which in turn
reduces incentives to provide innovative products or services at
competitive prices. This results in a stagnating market, with
consumers ultimately paying higher prices for lower quality goods.13
In an oligopolistic market, these results are often more
pronounced, frequently resulting in what is commonly known as a
“captive market.”14 Captive markets are characterized by potential
consumers being forced to choose from a limited number of
competitive suppliers, offering goods of a quality and price
completely predetermined by the suppliers and wholly unaffected by
competitive forces. Captive markets result in higher prices and less
diversity for consumers, ultimately creating a “Hobson’s choice” for
the consumer, with their only choices being to purchase what is
available or to make no purchase at all.15 Notably, the factors that
11. JOHN DUFFY, ECONOMICS 136 (Jerry Bobrow ed., 1st ed. 1993).
12. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d
Cir. 1945).
13. See MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS 187–90
(Jean-Olivier Hairault & Hubert Kempf eds., 2002).
14. DREW FUNDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, DYNAMIC MODELS OF OLIGOPOLY:
FUNDAMENTALS OF PURE AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 25 (Routledge ed., 2002).
15. See Charles Johnson, The Many Monopolies, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC.,
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/the-many-monopolies
[http://perma.cc/FE9E-WDKE] (archived Mar. 15, 2014).
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give rise to an oligopolistic market are also conducive to the
formation of cartels. Specifically, the hallmark of an oligopolistic
market is a marketplace in which consumers are forced to deal with
relatively few suppliers with dominant market share, high barriers to
entry into the market by competitors, and relatively interchangeable
products.16 Because cartels normally occur in an oligopolistic
market, authorities are able to easily identify companies holding a
dominant market share. However, it is usually difficult to prove that
competitor behavior is the result of a formalized agreement, rather
than the “success of a business which reflects only a superior
product, a well-run business, or luck.”17 Since anticompetitive
arrangements are illegal in most countries, and businesses involved
in such arrangements are often subject to immense punitive fines,
market allocation or price-fixing operations are typically well
concealed, and the details are often never fully revealed, even after
discovery and litigation.18 For this reason, when cartels are
uncovered and proven, they are prosecuted vigorously, with wellpublicized punishment, fines, and penalties intended to deter other
anti-competitive agreements.19
Since corporations and other business entities (known as
“private” cartels) rely on the sufferance of national and international
governments for their existence, they are subject to jurisdiction with
relative ease by a “host” country enforcing an anti-competitive
regime.20 However, the very nature of OPEC poses unique
jurisdictional challenges for competition authorities. Shielded by its
status as an “intergovernmental” organization and the sovereign
status of its Member Nations, OPEC openly engages in anticompetitive behaviors that would be considered illegal under almost
any legal regime that encourages free market competition.21 These
behaviors obviate the need for authorities to look for collusive
markers or patterns that would normally suggest or reveal the
presence of a clandestine cartel. For example, it is the organization’s
stated goal to unify petroleum policies of its members to ensure
stability of pricing and protect the interest of its members by

16. DUFFY, supra note 11, at 136.
17. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596
(1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. See CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW:
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 98 (4th ed. 2009).
19. See, e.g., Caroline Binham, Libor probes push cartel penalties to record
€3bn, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 8, 2014, at 17.
20. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OXFORD
MONOGRAPHS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2008).
21. See Solutions, supra note 10, at 38.
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limiting output in order to maintain their collective market power.22
OPEC imposes quota restrictions and production cuts on its
members, ensuring a balance between supply and demand in the
industry, and it manipulates pricing through use of a “price band
mechanism” where fluctuations in price-per-barrel outside of a
certain range will trigger new quota agreements.23
OPEC frequently reduces production in order to drive up prices
and relies on its status as a “public,” or government-sanctioned,
cartel to shield it from legal action by other nations. Despite
government tolerance of public cartels (e.g. labor unions—and,
during times of economic crisis such as during the Great
Depression, so-called “crisis cartels”),24 there is no evidence that
public cartels are less harmful to the public welfare than private
cartels. Further, because public cartels are governmentally
sanctioned or enforced, they have the potential to be more effective
and, therefore, more harmful.25 However, since the inception of
OPEC, American and European competition authorities have
regarded it with measured distrust, and despite strong
anticompetitive prohibitions in both the United States and EU, the
tremendous reliance on foreign oil on the part of both governments
has had the effect of tying their hands.
The United States has a long history of enforcement against
cartels, the elimination of which helped form early U.S. competition
law, when cartels were more commonly known as “trusts.”26 The
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 outlawed “every contract,
22. Edmund M. Daukoru, President, OPEC Conference, Oil Market Stability:
The Role of OPEC (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web
/en/994.htm [http://perma.cc/7KYA-JACB] (archived Mar. 15, 2014).
23. Arturo Silva Calderon, Secretary General, Speech to the European Energy
Foundation, The Role of OPEC in the 21st Century, Speech to the European
Energy Foundation, (July 9, 2003), http://www.opec.org/opec_web en/918.htm
[http://perma.cc/DC5Y-42VT] (archived May 12, 2014).
24. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [hereinafter
OECD], Crisis Cartels, OECD Doc. No. DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2011)20, 2 (Jan. 27,
2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu competition/international/multilateral
2011_feb_crisis_cartels.pdf [http://perma.cc/AQ23-28VP] (archived Mar. 15, 2014)
(submission from the European Union for the Global Forum on Competition, Feb.
17–18, 2011).
25. See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Address Before the TokyoAmerica Center: The Role of
Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets and Economic Growth (Nov. 12,
2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200484.htm [http:
/perma.cc/W59A-GTJZ] (archived Mar. 15, 2014).
26. See Rudolph J.R. Peritz, The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, in
HISTORIANS ON AMERICA 30, 33, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271
dwoa122709/Historians-on-America.pdf [http://perma.cc/V37-U6JY] (archived
Mar. 15, 2014).
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combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations,” which includes cartel violations such as price
fixing, limitations on output, and customer or territory allocation.27
The Federal Trade Commission plays a major role in regulating
competition by enforcing provisions of the antitrust laws that
prevent anticompetitive collusive activities, as well as the
subsequent acquisition or abuse of market power.28 Although
violations involving agreements between corporate competitors are
punishable as federal crimes in the United States,29 there is no
overarching international prohibition against cartels that exerts
pressure on an intergovernmental organization such as OPEC. By
any measure under U.S. antitrust law, OPEC is a cartel––a
“conspiracy in restraint of trade, under the Sherman Antitrust
Act,”30––and the organization’s impact on the U.S. economy has
implications that have affected nearly every industry on a microlevel as well as every family that relies on an automobile for
transportation.31 OPEC’s effect on the U.S. economy has been
calamitous at times, beginning with the 1973 oil embargo in
response to U.S. aid to Israel after the outbreak of hostilities
between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and
Syria.32
Frustrated by the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, the growing
demand for oil by the United States while maintaining 2% per year
pricing increases, and by paying 100% price increases to buy back
refined petroleum products that they had sold as crude, the Arab
members of OPEC proclaimed an oil embargo against the United
States when the U.S. began arms shipments to Israel.33 OPEC
announced an overnight price increase of 70% and plans to
immediately cut production by 5%, with further monthly cuts until
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
28. Solutions, supra note 10, at 35.
29. 15 U.S.C § 1.
30. See Andrew C. Udin, Comment, Slaying Goliath: The Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to OPEC, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001).
31. See Jim Snyder, Fracking Seen Robbing OPEC of Gasoline Pricing Power,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1210/fracking-seen-robbing-opec-of-gasoline-pricing-power.html [http://perma.cc/8U
EA-F73P] (archived Mar. 15, 2014).
32. See Mark Fischetti, 40 Years after OPEC Oil Embargo, U.S. May Finally
Get Off Imported Crude, SCI. AM. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://blogs.scientific
american.com/observations/2013/10/16/40-years-after-opec-oil-embargo-u-s-mayfinally-get-off-imported-crude/ [http://perma.cc/PW3K-4DL6] (archived Mar. 15,
2014).
33. See id.
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their objectives were met.34 These measures had the practical effect
of slamming the brakes on the vulnerable U.S. economy and forcing
concessions in the form of price increases and new trade
negotiations.35 With price controls by the government in place to
keep prices artificially low, shortages were already a possibility in
the face of growing U.S. consumption, but the embargo led to
shortfalls that were both unexpected and unprecedented.36 The
subsequent “oil shock” led to a scarcity of gasoline across the
nation, resulting in gas station closures, rationing lines that stretched
for miles and lasted for hours, and alternate fuel days for consumers
who could only buy fuel on days corresponding to whether their
license plate ended with odd or even numbers.37 Although the
embargo is now viewed as only the triggering mechanism for a
shortage due primarily to price controls, it remains the most visible
and painful reminder of OPEC’s first decision to use its leverage
over the production of oil in a punitive way and at the same time
stimulate real income for the producing Member Nations.
Under EU law, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union prohibits cartels and other agreements that could disrupt free
competition in the EU’s common market.38 Article 101 of the Treaty
prohibits cartels by declaring that they are incompatible with the
common market and automatically voids “all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the internal market.”39 The Article
further specifies a prohibition against agreements that: (1) set the
price at which goods, services, or commodities will be bought or
sold, or the conditions under which buying or selling will occur; (2)
set limits on the amount of goods produced or sold; (3) divide up a
market between competitors; (4) place certain trading parties at a
competitive disadvantage by applying different conditions to the
34. MARK WESTON, PROPHETS AND PRINCES: SAUDI ARABIA FROM
MUHAMMAD TO THE PRESENT, 217 (2008).
35. William. D. Smith, Iranian Oil Price Quadruples, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1973, at 1, 64.
36. Fischetti, supra note 32.
37. Chris Isidore, A return to gas lines and rationing? Current oil-price run
churns up memories of gasoline rationing and long waits on gas lines, CNN
MONEY (Oct. 13, 2004, 1:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2004/10/12/news
/economy/gas_lines/index.htm [http://perma.cc/Q65C-Q22J] (archived Feb. 16,
2014).
38. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union tit. VII, ch. 1, § 1, art. 101, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47,
88 [hereinafter TFEU].
39. Id.
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same type of transactions; or (5) make acceptance of contracts
subject to the acceptance of supplementary obligations with no
connection to the original contracts.40 Although there are limited
exceptions when agreements contribute to the improvement or
distribution of goods or the promotion of technical or economic
progress, cartels are generally illegal under EU competition law, and
the European Commission typically imposes heavy fines on
companies involved in a cartel.41 Further, since the driving principle
behind the European Union is the establishment of a centralized
common market among all of the independent member states,42
“public” cartels pose a unique risk of rendering EU competition law
ineffective. In order to address this, “public” cartels that are
sanctioned by Member States are specifically addressed in the treaty
governing the functioning of the European Union.43
Another unique feature of EU competition law specifically
addresses the secretive nature of cartels: the doctrine of “leniency,”
which encourages cartel members to provide evidence of the cartel’s
existence in exchange for a waiver of any future fines imposed.44
With fines ranging into the hundreds of millions of Euros, the
leniency policy is a strong incentive for cartel members to cooperate
with the EU in revealing the existence of what is considered one of
the “most serious violations of antitrust rules.”45 However, the open
actions of OPEC negate the need for application of any method of
discovering surreptitious agreements in the European Union, just as
it negates this need in the United States. It is clear that OPEC is as
much a cartel under EU law as it is under the U.S. legal regime.46
However, in spite of vigorous prosecution of cartels on both a
private and public level by the European Commission, the EU has
joined the United States in its abstention from asserting competition
law against OPEC’s distortion of the world oil market.
40. Id.
41. THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPLAINED: COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMM’N 5
(2013), http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/competition_en.pdf [http://perma.cc
/3N4H-HW4F] (archived Mar. 15, 2014).
42. The history of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://Europa
.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm [http://perma.cc/D3KE-M3R6] (archived
Mar. 15, 2014) (see 1980-1989, The changing face of Europe—the fall of the
Berlin Wall).
43. See TFEU, supra note 38, art. 107.
44. See Press Release, European Union, Commission Adopts New Leniency
Policy For Companies Which Give Information On Cartels (Feb. 13, 2002),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-247_en.htm [http://perma
.cc/U59Y-VRCK] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
45. Id.
46. See TFEU, supra note 38, art. 101.
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II. LIMITIATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF U.S. AND EU
COMPETITION LAW OVER OPEC
Both the United States and European Union have failed to
seriously challenge OPEC for several fundamental reasons, the
principle of which is an intrinsic reliance on the availability of
affordable oil to drive their respective economies.47 While this
concept is elemental, it cannot be stressed enough in light of the fact
that demand for oil is increasing even in the face of massive efforts
to reduce reliance on this type of fuel.48
The United States relies on fossil fuels to provide approximately
80% of its energy, including nearly two-thirds of its electricity and
virtually all of its transportation fuels.49 Even with aggressive
development and deployment of new renewable and nuclear
technologies, it is likely that reliance on fossil fuels to power an
expanding economy will actually increase, at least over the next two
decades.50 With a population recently exceeding 500 million
citizens,51 the European Union is also “heavily dependent” on oil,
particularly for use in the transport sector and for domestic and
industrial use in some Member States.52 Although consumption has
declined somewhat in the last few years, the European Union still
ranks as one of the top consumers of oil in the world, with an
estimated 12.7 million barrels per day consumed in 2012.53
47. See, e.g., William L. Watts, House takes aim at OPEC, WALL ST. J.:
MARKET WATCH (Mar. 14, 2007, 5:28 PM), http://www.marketwatch
.com/story/house-votes-to-strip-opecs-antitrust-immunity [http://perma.cc/U5FGG6EN] (archived Mar. 15, 2014).
48. See Jorn Madslien, Stability fears rise as oil reliance grows, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 26, 2004, 12:00 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3953907.stm
[http://perma.cc/5859-UXT9] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
49. See Primary Energy Consumption by Source, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Feb. 2014), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mer/pdf/pages/sec1_7.pdf [http://perma
.cc/LU4J-3QJB] (archived Mar. 15, 2014).
50. See Duncan Clark, Why can’t we quit fossil fuels?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
17, 2013, 12:49 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/apr/17/whycant-we-give-up-fossil-fuels [http://perma.cc/XCD3-SRH7] (archived Mar. 15,
2014).
51. Matej Hruska, EU Population Tops 500 Million, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (July 29, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content
/jul2010/gb20100729_623637.htm [http://perma.cc/X83J-FMAJ] (archived Mar.
15, 2014).
52. Oil and its derivatives, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu
/competition/sectors/energy/oil/oil_en.html [http://perma.cc/MDY8-FJNL] (archived
Mar. 15, 2014).
53. BRITISH PETROLEUM, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY, 11
(2013), http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review
_of _world_energy_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/FC7A-TJ5G] (archived May 12,
2014).
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In both cases, massive dependence on oil poses unique problems
when addressing the application of U.S. or EU antitrust law against
OPEC. With economies and industries driven by oil, OPEC has the
power to bring both powers to their knees if it were to decide to
initiate another embargo, which would cause oil prices to
skyrocket.54 In the case of the European Union, OPEC has also used
the threat of limiting production if it discovered the European Union
using its own emergency reserves of oil to make oil more affordable
for its citizens.55 At its summit in 2000, after the United States
opened its strategic reserves to keep prices low, OPEC warned it
would cut production to drive up prices; in doing so, OPEC was
aiming to balance any reductions due to a similar EU utilization of
its strategic reserves.56
Since then, the United States has maintained a tenuous
relationship with OPEC. Despite the recent dramatic increase in
shale oil production, the United States imported over 40% of the oil
consumed in 2012, with 28% of those imports coming from
producers in the Persian Gulf. 57 Although most U.S. imports were
from the Western Hemisphere, 9% were from Venezuela and
another 13% were from Saudi Arabia, both of whom are OPEC
members.58 In sum, approximately 28% of all the oil imported into
the U.S. in 2012 was from Persian Gulf countries, such as Bahrain,
Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, many
of which are OPEC Member Nations.59
The United States’ dependence on foreign oil has historically led
to an enormous reliance on the goodwill of an organization that is
per se illegal under U.S. antitrust law, but antitrust authorities are
conspicuously quiet when it comes to confronting OPEC’s market
controls and manipulations. In the last few decades, there have been
suggestions that the United States may have the means to assert
subject-matter jurisdiction over OPEC and should move towards
pursuing claims against the organization despite the dismissal of an

54. See Ken Blackwell, Forty Years of OPEC Manipulation, THE DAILY
CALLER (Oct. 15, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/15/forty-yearsof-opec-manipulation/ [http://perma.cc/H7WR-TQWD] (archived Mar. 15, 2014).
55. See OPEC warns Europe on oil, BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2000, 7:31
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/944785.stm [http://perma.cc/8ZHF-T
75S] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
56. See id.
57. See How dependent are we on foreign oil?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm [http://perma
.cc/Z7EW-VH9Y] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
58. See id.
59. See id.
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earlier attempt to assert jurisdiction in 1981.60 There, the court held
that OPEC was shielded from jurisdiction because it was acting in
its governmental capacity when it regulated production.61 However,
in 1993, this earlier contention was cast into doubt by Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California, in which the Supreme Court ruled that
the Sherman Act could be applied to the acts of foreign corporations
committed in foreign countries “that were meant to produce and did
in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States,” which
OPEC’s actions consistently do.62
Increasing gasoline prices and higher prices for oil used by
industry, such as airplane and jet fuel, have also led to legislative
pressure from both the Senate and House. In April 2000, and again
in April 2001, Senator Arlen Specter sent letters to both President
Clinton and President Bush urging litigation against OPEC.63
Senator Specter also argued in front of Congress on June 22, 2005,
urging the legislature to find that OPEC’s immunity from
jurisdiction be nullified.64
In the past, OPEC’s immunity from suit sprung from its
classification as a governmental entity, which would place it under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, providing that a
foreign defendant shall be immune from suit in any federal or state
court if the defendant qualifies as a “Foreign State” and unless a
statutory exception to immunity applies.65 However, Senator Specter
argued against the courts, finding that OPEC Members’ cooperation
to fix pricing was a “governmental activity” as opposed to
“commercial activity” and suggested that OPEC should be subject to
suit in either U.S. federal court or the International Court of Justice
at the Hague.66 In June of 2005, a day before the Senator spoke, the
Senate passed Senate Bill 555 by voice vote, also known as the “No
Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2005,” which codified
the ability to proceed against OPEC under antitrust laws.67
Ultimately, however, U.S. administrations remained cold to the idea
of sanctions or enforcement against OPEC even after further
congressional demands for action. For example, the House of
Representatives passed their version of the “No Oil Producing and
Exporting Cartels Act” by a supermajority vote of 345–72 in May
60. See generally Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Org. of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
61. See id. at 1361.
62. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
63. See 151 CONG. REC. 13,658 (2005) (statement of Sen. Specter).
64. See id.
65. See 28 U.S.C §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–11 (2012).
66. See 151 CONG. REC. 13,660 (2005).
67. S. 555, 109th Cong. § 7(a) (2005).
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2007, in the face of the direct threat of veto by then President
George W. Bush.68 These bills seemingly would provide the
statutory exception that a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act claim
requires, which would allow federal courts to hear claims against
OPEC.69 Notwithstanding these attempts by Congress, there has
been no action to pursue the organization thus far, leaving litigation
as the one of the few avenues by which to challenge to OPEC
although recent rulings may have foreclosed this as a viable option
as well. In 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of a major challenge to OPEC’s antitrust violations.70 In
Spectrum Stores, et al. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., et al., a group of
gasoline retailers brought class actions against oil companies owned
by OPEC Member Nations, alleging that the national oil companies
conspired with OPEC to fix crude oil prices in the United States
through production limits.71 Although the suit was brought against
oil production companies rather than the OPEC Member Nations
themselves, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the district
court under both the political question and act of state doctrines.72
The Court of Appeals held that matters raised in the complaints
“effectively challenge the structure of OPEC and its relation to the
worldwide production of petroleum”.73 Citing the political question
doctrine, the Court concluded that since the complaint implicated
matters of foreign policy, which are in the purview of the executive
and legislative branches, it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the
claims.74 Finally, citing the act of state doctrine, the Court of
Appeals held that adjudication of the suit would call into question
the acts of foreign governments concerning their natural resources,
which was outside the sphere of the Judicial Branch.75
In the absence of a viable challenge to OPEC, the United States’
reliance on imported oil has maintained a high level of dependence

68. See Watts, supra note 47.
69. S. 555, 109th Cong. § 7(a) (2005). (The proposed bill sought to
specifically exempt OPEC from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act when it
was acting in a commercial, rather than in a governmental, capacity. Further, the
bill would specify that the Act of State Doctrine would not prevent courts from
hearing anti-trust suits brought against foreign governments).
70. See Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 943
(5th Cir. 2011).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 943.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 955.
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on many countries that are avowed enemies of U.S. interests.76
Unlike sources such as Mexico and Canada, which along with Saudi
Arabia are among the top three oil exporters to the United States,
many OPEC Member Nations are not aligned with the United States
ideologically and cannot be expected to be particularly sympathetic
to fluctuations in the U.S. economy.77 For example, since the priceper-barrel of oil is tied to the U.S. dollar, any decline in the value of
the dollar has often led OPEC members to call for price increases in
the price-per-barrel in order make up for any shortfall in revenues
while, at the same time, exceeding their self-imposed quotas to
bolster any loss of revenues that the member nations are
experiencing.78 Price increases such as this force the United States to
spend more on imports while increasing the national debt, which in
turn lengthens the time it will take for the economy to recover and
the dollar’s value to rebound from normal trading fluctuations in the
world’s currency markets.79 While this is damaging in a concrete
sense, it is mitigated by the fact that the price of oil is pinned to the
dollar, and the normal standards of economics are skewed as far as
they pertain to the United States. Most oil importing countries are
forced to reserve capital in the form of U.S. dollars in order to
maintain imports at the necessary levels, and oil exporting countries
similarly hold, as their currency reserve, billions in U.S. dollars, the
currency in which they are paid.80 This reservation of reserve capital
in U.S. dollars, in turn, creates a constant upwards pressure on the
dollar, independent of economic conditions within the United States;
this upward pressure on the dollar allows the United States to
discount bond rates to other countries.81 Because of these discounted
bond rates, oil exporters and producers are able to invest profits
76. See Chavez warns US over Iran policy, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2006, 9:57
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4771229.stm [http://perma.cc/X59T-B5
H2] (archived Mar. 16, 2014).
77. See Crude Oil and Top Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petro
leum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html [http://perma
.cc/QC49-ZQ6K] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
78. See Grant Smith & Fred Pals, OPEC Members Seek $100 Oil to Counter
Dollar Weakness, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2010, 8:32 AM) http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2010-10-15/opec-members-seek-100-a-barrel-oil-as-sliding-dollar-cuts
-real-revenue.html [http://perma.cc/3U3Y-LFWW] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
79. See Meg Handley, How the National Debt Affects You, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT: MONEY (Mar. 31, 2011), http://money.usnews.com/money
/personal-finance/articles/2011/03/31/how-the-national-debt-affects-you?page=2
[http://perma.cc/CD8C-PCLD] (archived Mar. 16, 2014).
80. See C.P. CHANDRASEKHAR & JAYATI GHOSH, INT’L DEV. ECON. ASSOCS.,
OIL PRICES AND THE US DOLLAR 1 (2008), http://www.networkideas.org/news
/mar2008/oil_prices.pdf [http://perma.cc/78VV-5SEZ] (archived Mar. 16, 2014).
81. See id.
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made on oil straight back into the U.S. economy, with virtually zero
currency risk. This allows the United States to run higher, and
virtually permanent, trade deficits at a more sustainable level than
most other countries and also maintains relatively low prices on
imported goods.82 Oil producing states, such as Venezuela and Iran,
that are ideologically opposed to the United States have a vested
interest in seeing a weaker dollar and have pushed for oil to be
priced in other currencies.83
Undoubtedly, it is in the United States’ interest to maintain the
price of oil in U.S. dollars, and prosecuting OPEC under
international or federal law would be sure to alienate Member
Nations with the potential to affect the currency to which oil is
pinned.84 Whether this is a valid reason for the U.S. restraint, the
Federal Trade Commission has maintained two major reasons for
non-enforcement against OPEC: the foreign sovereign immunity
doctrine, which formed the basis of Senator Specter’s challenge as
discussed above, and the act of state doctrine, which similarly
declares that a U.S. court will not adjudicate a politically sensitive
dispute that would require the court to judge the legality of the
sovereign act of a foreign state.85 Similarly, although the European
Union takes a strict view of cartels, extraterritorial application of EU
competition law may be fundamentally limited by the treaty that
establishes the role of the EU competition law itself.
In addition, since EU competition law focuses on trade between
EU member states in furtherance of its goal of common market
integration, application of treaty provisions to nations or states that
are not members seems to leave the European Commission with a
lack of meaningful enforcement options. Article 101 of the Treaty
does not seem to contemplate governmental bodies in its applicable
restrictions of “undertakings” when it refers to “companies,” and
European courts have consistently held that the European
Commission’s competition rules do not apply to conduct in the
exercise of official authority or when an organization is acting as a
public authority.86
82. See Cóilín Nunan, Oil, Currency and the War on Iraq, THE FOUNDATION
ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABILITY, http://www.feasta.org/documents
/papers/oil1.htm [http://perma.cc/T6RR-GNZB] (archived Mar. 16, 2014).
83. See Carl Mortished, Iran turns from dollar to euro in oil sales, THE
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006, at 51.
84. See Faisal Islam, When will we buy oil in euros?, THE OBSERVER, Feb.
23, 2003, at 5.
85. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 254 (1897).
86. See Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche
Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577, para 57 4 CMLR 913, (noting that
according to the case law of the court, the Treaty rules on competition did not
FOR THE
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The central role of the EU is to serve as an intergovernmental
organization,87 and as such, the sovereignty of its Member States
plays a central role in the cohesiveness of the union. Further,
although the EU’s general approach emphasizes the supremacy of
intergovernmental law, its approach to conflict encourages
cooperation rather than punitive measures.88 An example of this is
the “leniency policy” discussed above, which, although it is one of
the strongest tools used by the EU in competition law, it is also
indicative of a recurring fundamental paradigm of cooperation.
Similarly, the European Union appears to emphasize cooperation in
its approach to OPEC. For example, in the first annual joint
ministerial meeting in 2005, both the European Union and OPEC
mutually expressed that they wanted to “deepen ties” after soaring
oil prices prompted economists to cut growth forecasts for parts of
Europe.89 OPEC members, who were producing close to capacity,
sought EU investment to increase their potential output, and in a
joint statement, both powers indicated the intention to pursue
“market stability, with reasonable prices that are consistent with the
need for healthy economic growth and steady revenue streams for
producing countries.”90
Recently, the 14th Annual International Oil Summit, held in
April of 2013, addressed issues such as global energy “interdependence,” long term fossil fuel prospects, and the importance of
“stable and fair” pricing.91 Whether these meetings have succeeded
in maintaining the stability of oil prices within the EU is debatable.
EU press releases justify the meetings, however, as a “continued
dialogue and exchanges of views,” a dialogue elemental to
improving understanding among all parties; as a result, the meetings

apply to activity which is connected to the “exercise of the powers of a public
authority.”
87. See TFEU, supra note 38, art. 2(4).
88. See generally DANIELA NEPOTE & SYLVIE OCCELLI, INSTITUTO
RICERCHE ECONOMICO SOCIALI DEL PIEMONTE, NO. 183/2004, BEYOND COREPERIPHERY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE EU COOPERATION (2004), available at http:
//www.digibess.it/fedora/repository/openbess:TO082-01643
[http://perma.cc/9PK5-89LK] (archived Mar. 17, 2014).
89. See Stephen Voss, OPEC Assures EU of Ample Oil Supply at First
Summit, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2005, 2:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps
/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ays86jjX.Ppw&refer=Europe [http://perma.cc/V5
PQ-K2EH] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See Abdalla Sheik El-Badri, Sec’y Gen., OPEC, Keynote Speech at the
14th International Oil Summit (Apr. 4, 2013), available at http://www.opec.org
/opec_web/en/2529.htm [http://perma.cc/4G43-VL25] (archived Mar. 16, 2014).
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were “in line with the mutual interests of supporting oil market
stability and predictability, for the benefit of the world at large.”92
The mission statement contained within the OPEC Statute itself
suggests that securing “an efficient, economic and regular supply of
petroleum to customers” is one of the hallmarks of an organization
that once used its power over the global oil market to send
economies into cycles of inflation and recession.93 With an ongoing
dialogue and the tendency of the European Union to engage in
cooperative relationship building, the EU is unlikely to initiate any
maneuvers toward prosecution of OPEC as an “agreement in
restraint of trade,” and the European Union’s ability to successfully
do so within the constraints of the treaty’s definition of
“undertakings” is doubtful.
Both the United States and the European Union face formidable
challenges in asserting an effective claim against OPEC, and even if
successful, would need to consider the relevance of any international
laws regarding sovereign immunities. Practical legal issues also
include the nature of the jurisdiction to be asserted over OPEC, how
a factual investigation could be conducted with respect to
documents and witnesses located outside the United States, and the
nature and enforceability of remedies, as judgments made against
OPEC are bound to be politically counter-productive and
problematic, with immediate retaliatory measures.
This is not to suggest that OPEC itself has not evolved since the
1970s when it was seen as fairly militant and willing to wield its
power to declare embargoes that would throw economies around the
world into downward spirals. In the past few decades, OPEC’s
recurring theme, as reflected in its mission statement, has been
“stabilization of the markets,” attempting to achieve a delicate
balance between keeping oil prices high enough to produce a
constant flow of income for Member Nations yet low enough to
discourage consumers from diverting significant revenues into
alternative sources of energy.94 OPEC has largely succeeded,
maintaining oil pricing at a level that has allowed for global
economic growth while meeting the economic needs of its Member

92. See Press Release, European Comm’n, EU-OPEC hold Roundtable
meeting to discuss Energy Policy (May 30, 2007), available at http://europa.eu
/rapid/press-release_IP-07-729_en.htm?locale=en [http://perma.cc/84VL-UJKD]
(archived Feb. 16, 2014).
93. See Our Mission, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES,
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm [http://perma.cc/C3T6-LXU
V] (archived Mar. 16, 2014).
94. See Blackwell, supra note 54.
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Nations.95 This has led to a strange dichotomy: on one hand, OPEC
can be compared to a corporation, acting in a predictable way to
maximize income for its “shareholders”—that is, its Member
Nations. On the other hand, the fact that the global oil market is
regulated by a loose association of countries that are often
ideologically opposed to U.S. interests has led every U.S. President
since Nixon to have promised, and failed, to reduce U.S.
dependence on foreign oil.96
In the face of an ever-increasing global appetite for oil, OPEC
has been viewed as a necessary evil, an organization that is outside
the direct reach of U.S. and EU law, but one that both countries have
relied on over time to stabilize oil prices and promote global
economic growth.97 In any case, both the United States and the
European Union have shown a strong disinclination to prosecute
OPEC due to both practical and political reasons, with the European
Union suffering from the additional hurdle of strict interpretation of
its competition law, which does not currently contemplate suits
against sovereign states.98 Now, and for the foreseeable future,
notwithstanding a major shift in the political and economic climate,
the viability of an antitrust suit being brought against OPEC is
negligible.
III. HOW ECONOMICS MAY SUCCEED WHERE LAW HAS FAILED
For nearly half a century, against the backdrop of this uneasy,
tenuous relationship between U.S. and EU consumers and Middle
East producers, OPEC has maintained a nearly unassailable position
as an oil “superpower.” As recently as 2004, commentators were
suggesting that “OPEC’s hold on the oil market, and thus on the
95. See Ayesha Daya & Ola Galal, OPEC May Maintain Oil Output in
Vienna on Uneven Economic Growth, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2010, 5:30 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-10/opec-may-maintain-oil-output-at-vi
enna-meeting-on-uneven-economic-growth.html
[http://perma.cc/PM42-DZ5J]
(archived Mar. 16, 2014).
96. See Gus Lubin, The Long List Of Presidents Who Promised To Reduce
Foreign Oil Dependence And Failed, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 30, 2011, 11:35 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/american-foreign-oil-dependence-2011-3?op=1
[http://perma.cc/5X9D-7CQ2] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
97. See Tom Doggett, U.S. wants OPEC to stabilize oil price, REUTERS (May
22, 2009, 4:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/22/us-usa-opec-chuinterview-idUSTRE54L61620090522 [http://perma.cc/T429-KW9R] (archived
Mar. 16, 2014).
98. See Cedric Ryngaert, Domestic Remedies Against OPEC 14–16 (Inst. For
Int’l Law, Working Paper No. 145, 2010), available at http://www.law.kuleuven
.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP145e.pdf [http://perma.cc/M2HQ-WM9A] (archived
Mar. 16, 2014).

298

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 2

world economy, looks set to grow sharply in the coming decades.”99
However, a series of random factors have seemingly conspired to
undermine OPEC’s stranglehold on the world’s oil market and
reduce its ability to use its oil production capabilities as a tool of
political and financial coercion. These factors have inspired a
variety of reactions, from elation on the part of conservative
“hawks” heralding the eventual irrelevancy of OPEC, to uneasiness
on the part of political leaders in Arab countries that depend on oil
revenues to maintain political and economic stability.100 Whether
OPEC is simply diminishing in stature or is in full-scale decline, the
situation has prompted leaders of OPEC Member Nations to take
notice.101
While OPEC may not ever be completely irrelevant, as some
commentators have suggested, it is unlikely that OPEC will be able
to exert the almost unfettered control over oil prices that it has in the
past. The most likely scenario is that the simple rules of economics
will accomplish what decades of antitrust law has failed to do:
reduce OPEC from a market regulator and cartel to a simple market
participant competing against other oil producers for market share.
When examined as a whole, the effect of these individual events
is almost uncanny in its cumulative ability to systematically and
rapidly strip away power and influence that OPEC has fought for
decades to build and maintain. The event that has seemingly had the
greatest effect on OPEC’s market share is the series of recent
technological advances leading to an unprecedented shift in North
American access to, and production of, shale oil and gas.102 This
“shale oil boom” was entirely unexpected; as recently as 2007,
skyrocketing demand from China and India for oil led the
International Energy Agency (IEA) to issue warnings that global
demand was increasing in the face of supply shortfalls and urging
99. Jad Mouawad, Irrelevant? OPEC is Sitting Pretty, Week in Review, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, § 4, at 1, 3.
100. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, US Shale threatens Saudi funding crisis
and demise of OPEC, TELEGRAPH (July 29, 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.tele
graph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/10209822/US-shale-threatens
-Saudi-funding-crisis-and-demise-of-OPEC.html
[http://perma.cc/FU86-KPL4]
(archived Mar. 16, 2014).
101. See, e.g., Timur Moon, Oil Price Slips as Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal
Warns of West’s Fracking Boom, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 29, 2013, 11:26 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/495259/20130729/prince-alwaleed-talal-oil-priceshale-gas.htm [http://perma.cc/P3MZ-N5YA] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
102. See Asjylyn Loder, Unforeseen U.S. Oil Boom Upends Markets as
Drilling Spreads, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2014-01-08/unforseen-u-s-oil-boom-upends-world-markets-as-drillingspreads.html [http://perma.cc/HKT7-2GWB] (archived Mar. 16, 2014).
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oil exporting countries to increase production in the face of then
record high prices.103
Noting that “solving energy problems is a global responsibility
that demands action by all countries,” the IEA explained that, as
need for oil imports continued to grow and supplies leveled off in
many industrialized nations, the world would become increasingly
reliant on a smaller number of oil-exporting countries, such as the
Middle East.104 With economic growth in China and India alone
accounting for a 70% increase in energy demand over the previous
two years, the Member Nations of OPEC were positioned to adjust
prices upwards, with the IEA predicting enormous increases in the
price-per-barrel in the face of current production.105 However,
OPEC was kept in check by the surprising rise in Russian oil
production, which was a mitigating factor that functioned to
moderate prices even in the face of exploding demand.106 At that
time, Russian production levels almost rebounded to their Soviet-era
all-time high of 11.4 million barrels per day, and the country rivaled
Saudi Arabia as the world’s top producer.107 While the market was
kept in check by Russian production, technological developments in
enhanced oil recovery techniques, such as advances in hydraulic
fracturing, led to the beginning of a meteoric rise in North American
production, which made formerly non-recoverable oil accessible.108
These technological advances, combined with state-of-the art
equipment and vast shale deposits, have led the IEA to predict that
U.S. production will surpass Russia and Saudi Arabia, making the
United States the world’s top oil producer by 2015.109 Nearly half of
a century of presidential campaign promises notwithstanding, amid
booming output from shale formations, the IEA noted that the
United States will be close to energy self-sufficiency within the next
103. See Jad Mouawad & Julia Werdigier, Warning on Impact of China and
India Oil Demand, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007
/11/07/business/07cnd-energy.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/G3L5-PF9R] (archived
Feb. 16, 2014).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Mouawad, supra note 92.
107. See Thane Gustafson, Russian Oil Industry at a Crossroads as Infrastructure
Ages, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/business/
global/russian-oil-industry-at-a-crossroads-as-infrastructure-ages.html?pagewanted=
all [http://perma.cc/YW73-CEEG] (archived Feb. 16, 2014). See also BRITISH
PETROLEUM, supra note 53.
108. See Loren Steffy, How Long will the Fracking Oil Boom Last?, FORBES (Dec.
11, 2013, 8:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorensteffy/2013/12/11/how-longwill-the-fracking-boom-last/ [http://perma.cc/T3CQ-8MA3] (archived Mar. 16, 2014).
109. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, at 458
(2013).
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two decades.110 In spite of declining production in the Middle East
and Russia, economists for IEA have stated that they do not expect
the United States to continue as the world’s top producer beyond the
2020s, after which U.S. production will eventually plateau and
decline.111 Further, as aging production infrastructure in OPEC
Member Nations is replaced and production technology catches up,
Middle East oil may again regain dominance. However, it has also
been suggested that replication of skyrocketing U.S. production may
be more difficult than it appears.112 A recent study has noted that the
United States has access to 60% of the global availability of drilling
rigs; moreover, the study revealed that 95% of U.S. drilling rigs can
perform horizontal drilling, allowing for hydraulic fracturing at a
level of intensity that may be impossible for other countries to
achieve in the short term.113 The boom in U.S production, followed
closely by increases in Canadian production, has led other oilproducing countries to reevaluate their own production capabilities.
Russia, currently at its production limit due to aging infrastructure
and exhaustion of existing oil fields, is hoping that new horizontal
technologies may result in a renaissance for the country’s oil
industry.114
The availability of the North American shale oil has reduced
global demand for Middle East oil to the extent that Middle East
politicians have expressed concern. As recently as July 2013, Saudi
Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal said demand for oil from OPEC
Member Nations states was “in clear and continuous decline” and
noted Saudi Arabia’s continuing reliance on oil estimated to
comprise up to 92% of the country’s budget.115 Aside from simply
expressing concern, OPEC members may have taken more direct
measures to counter the effects of the U.S. energy boom. Amid
concerns over the safety of hydraulic fracturing, the controversial
method of production that is responsible for vast increases in oil and
gas recovery, a 2012 film highlighting the dangers of the hydraulic
fracturing process was revealed to have received financing from the
United Arab Emirates, a member of OPEC and the world’s third-

110. See id.
111. See id. at 466.
112. LEONARDO MAUGERI, GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY PROJECT, BELFER CTR.
FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, DISCUSSION PAPER
#2013-05, THE SHALE OIL BOOM: A U.S. PHENOMENON 1 (2013), http://belfer
center.ksg.harvard.edu/files/The%20US%20Shale%20Oil%20Boom%20Web.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4WPU-82M3] (archived Feb. 16, 2014).
113. Id.
114. See Gustafson, supra note 107.
115. See Moon, supra note 101.
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largest oil exporter.116 Critics of the film have contended that the
UAE was “trying to drum up opposition to more U.S. oil
production, which could compete with its crude exports.”117
OPEC itself has been forced to downgrade its economic
prospects, forecasting a global decline in demand for its oil, with a
corresponding reduction in production.118 However, reductions in
demand by the United States have been mitigated by increases in
demand by China and India as noted above, with China overtaking
America as the largest buyer of oil on the international markets in
September of 2013.119 Nevertheless, even with falling Western
demand, OPEC’s reliance on demand from China may be misplaced
should tensions break out in the Middle East. China’s expanding
economy and growing demand for resources require an increasing
supply but stability of the supply chain may be equally important.
This has led China to look to Canada as a potential supplier of crude
oil.120
China is Canada’s second biggest trading partner behind the
United States, and although Canada currently exports an estimated
99% of their energy products to the United States, this may be
changing shortly.121 Costly delays in the construction of a massive
pipeline between the Alberta sands oil fields may change Canadian
oil export patterns. This pipeline, known as the Keystone XL
Pipeline, would run from Edmonton, the “nerve center” of Canada’s
massive oil sands, down through Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, ending in Houston, and would
provide the United States with a steady supply of affordable oil from
a friendly trading partner that has growing production
capabilities.122 However, resistance from the environmental lobby
116. See Steve Hargreaves, Matt Damon fracking film backed by big OPEC
member, CNNMONEY (Oct. 1, 2012, 12:54 PM), http://economy.money.cnn.com
/2012/10/01/matt-damon-fracking/ [http://perma.cc/XV2A-QVK8] (archived Feb.
16, 2014).
117. Id.
118. See WORLD OIL OUTLOOK, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING
COUNTRIES 56 (James Griffin et al. eds., 2013), http://www.opec.org/opec
_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/WOO_2013.pdf [http://per
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has mired the crucial project in a contentious debate, and pressure
on legislators has led to costly regulatory delays.123 While the
United States has gone back and forth over whether to construct the
pipeline, China has expressed a willingness to pay for construction
of the “Northern Gateway Pipeline,” a proposed pipeline between
Alberta’s oil sands to coastal British Columbia, from which oil
could be sent directly across the Pacific to supply China’s growing
demand.124
The Canadian government has expressed interest in increasing
trade with China, and delays in the Keystone XL pipeline approval
may provide the impetus to begin diverting oil from the United
States to China.125 China has invested billions in Canadian oil and
gas projects and in Canadian oil companies such as Syncrude,
Athabasca Oil Sands, and Penn West Energy.126 Securing access to
Canadian oil would be a crucial, strategic victory for China because
of the ongoing instability in the Middle East. As of 2010, roughly
half of China’s imported oil arrived from the Middle East, including
oil from countries with declining outputs or those that are classified
as inherently unstable, such as Libya and Iraq.127
Notwithstanding political instability of the producing countries
themselves, transport of Middle East oil is also a problem for China.
A large percentage of oil exported to Asia must pass through the
Strait of Hormuz, a narrow strait between the Gulf of Oman and the
Persian Gulf, which is the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to
the open ocean.128 With Iran on one side and the United Arab
Emirates on the other (both of which are OPEC Member Nations),
the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most strategically
important oil transit routes.129 According to a 2011 report by the
U.S. Energy Information Administration, about 20% of the world’s
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crude oil and about 35% of petroleum traded by sea passed through
this route in 2011 alone.130 Of this amount, roughly 85% of these
crude oil exports went to Asian markets, with Japan, India, South
Korea, and China being the largest destinations.131 With such an
important passage located in a region of ongoing political instability,
China oil imports are exposed to a significant risk: as recently as
2012, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to
increased UN sanctions sparked by Iran’s pursuit of nuclear
technology and again in response to a recent EU oil embargo of
Iran.132
In the future, increasing reliance on Middle Eastern oil may also
have diplomatic implications for China-U.S. relations. Increasing
U.S. energy independence may make goodwill on the part of the
Middle East strategically dispensable for the United States, allowing
more freedom to take diplomatic actions that further U.S. interests
but indirectly damage Chinese interests. For example, lessening
reliance on Middle Eastern oil may free the United States from
restraints it has been under in dealing with unfriendly Middle
Eastern countries, making it more willing to disrupt oil output in
times of conflict at little risk to its own supply. However, China’s
increasing reliance on Middle Eastern oil at a time of decreasing
U.S. reliance may leave China more susceptible to diplomatic
pressure by the United States if the United States were to support
regime change or use sanctions against a politically unfriendly
Middle Eastern country in order to gain leverage over China.
Further, the presence and influence of the United States in the
Middle East may be a factor in the region’s stability. Although
China is now the single greatest purchaser of Middle Eastern oil, a
United States withdrawal from the Middle East may bring about
even more political instability with which China is ill equipped to
handle.133 Securing access to Canadian oil would allow China to
mitigate both the risks of oil transportation disruptions and its
increasing reliance on a politically unstable region; compared with
other sources of oil, Canada would be a stable, reliable supplier that
would help China satisfy its growing demand. Further, China’s
increased reliance in Canadian oil would weaken OPEC’s control of
the oil market.
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IV. OPEC’S EFFECTIVENESS AS A MARKET PARTICIPANT RATHER
THAN AS A MARKET REGULATOR
As noted above, while the explosive growth in the U.S. oil
market may not reduce OPEC to a state of irrelevance in the world
oil market, it will certainly not have the control over the market it
has exercised in the past. That alone may be problematic for an
organization that imposes production limits on its Member Nations
in order to control pricing. If OPEC were to lose its ability to set
market prices by limiting production, the benefits enjoyed by
Member Nations would disappear; it would retain the weaknesses of
a cartel without corresponding benefits. Further, the weaknesses in
this case would be more pronounced for Member Nations that have,
until recently, enjoyed a steady stream of oil profits flowing into
their economies.
One major problem for the organization is that it is made up of
independent sovereign nations. Additionally, oil production aside,
each nation has different means of promoting economic growth and
diversification of industry. Each Member Nation has different
trading partners, geographic boundaries, and barriers to trade, and
many have different cultures, languages, and monetary systems. For
example, aside from oil production, Nigeria, Iran, and Venezuela are
vastly different, with different political, religious, and social
paradigms. While each nation undoubtedly counts on oil revenues,
some countries may have greater natural resources, domestic
production capabilities, or alternate revenue streams that they use to
fund their economies. Member Nations with diversified industries
and economies will undoubtedly be able to handle fluctuations in oil
prices better than countries that count on oil revenues to fund the
majority of their national budget. However, poorer Member Nations
that have relied on oil revenues without concurrent diversification of
their economies, or those that have failed to invest in infrastructure
or generation of employment opportunities, may be unable to
maintain sustainable economic growth due to future fluctuations in
oil revenues.134
The governments of poor Member Nations may be completely
dependent on oil export revenues to fund their economies, a large
part of which may be government and social programs, and a certain
percentage of oil revenues may be diverted to subsidies for poor
citizens. OPEC Member Nations generally need oil to remain at a
certain price-per-barrel to fund their economies, which is known as
134. John L. Hammond, The Resource Curse and Oil Revenues in Angola and
Venezuela, 75 SCIENCE & SOC’Y 348, 352 (2011).
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the “fiscal break-even price.”135 For example, as of 2013, Saudi
Arabia had a fiscal break-even cost of $98 U.S. dollars per barrel,
while Ecuador required oil to be priced at $121 U.S. dollars per
barrel.136 Iran required the highest cost per barrel at $144.137 OPEC
Member Nations may depend completely on oil revenues to fund
social programs, and with rising populations, the Member Nations
find that they need higher oil prices each year just to make their
budgets balance.138
With OPEC able to regulate oil pricing through market
manipulation, the revenue needs of the Member Nations may
consistently be met. However, when forced to compete on the open
market, Member Nations that have not developed a strong economy
and a sound tax base may be unable to maintain their current
expenditures. In the wake of the 2010 demonstrations, civil
uprisings, and regime changes known as the “Arab Spring,”139
leaders across the Middle East may have cause for concern if
fluctuating oil prices lead to underfunding of social programs in the
face of high unemployment and limited economic opportunity.
With the ability to control oil prices, the Member Nations may
find membership in OPEC to be a benefit that they cannot forego,
but without that benefit, there may be little reason to abide by OPEC
production limits. As supply from non-OPEC oil producers
increases to meet global demand, OPEC will have a diminishing
role in market pricing, and the normal economics of supply and
demand may take over. If unforeseen events cause global demand to
level out or decrease, the resulting over-supply of the market would
put a downward pressure on the price of oil. In this case, individual
OPEC member nations would have no choice but to ignore
production limits in order to make up for profit shortfalls if the price
of oil falls below their individual fiscal break-even price.
In the event oil prices do fall that low, OPEC Members would
have zero incentive to abide by production limits (which typically
drive the price of oil upwards) because any supply shortfalls would
135. Ali Aissaoui, Modeling OPEC Fiscal Break-Even Oil Prices: New Findings
and Policy Insights, Economic Commentary, Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation
2 (2013), http://www.mees.com/en/articles/8163-modeling-opec-fiscal-break-even-oilprices-new-findings-and-policy-insights [http://perma.cc/BG5S-TCRM] (archived
Mar. 16, 2014).
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be covered by non-OPEC producers. At that point, it is likely that
collusive cartel behavior would be abandoned entirely because the
inherent collusion for joint-profit maximization means that each
cartel participant is restrained from competing against other cartel
members in order to maximize individual profits.140 Once OPEC
loses the ability to regulate global oil prices through production
limits and price fixing, individual Member Nations have no
incentive to abide by output restrictions and may in fact have no
choice but to ignore them.
Further, the explosion in U.S. production has differing effects on
the various Member Nations of OPEC. For example, Nigerian oil
exports have been directly affected by the spike in U.S. domestic
production because the oil being produced from the U.S. shale plays
is the highly prized “light, sweet crude” that Nigeria has historically
exported to the United States.141 Since July 2010, the United States,
once Nigeria’s biggest customer, has cut imports from more than 1
million barrels a day to 543,000 barrells as of October 2012.142
Angola, another OPEC Member Nation, finds itself in a similar
situation, with its market in the United States cut in half to 200,000
barrels a day, down from an average of 513,000 barrells in 2008.143
Experts are predicting that, before mid-2014, the United States and
Canada will stop importing light, sweet crude from West Africa
altogether.144 Algeria, another OPEC member, has also seen its
exports of light, sweet crude to the United States decline by about
half, but it produces a number of different types of crude oil that it
has historically sold to China.145 Although Algeria has an
established market within China and other Asian consumer
countries, it may now face competition in those countries from
Nigeria and Angola, and the resulting influx of light, sweet crude
from West Africa has the potential to exert a downward pressure on
140. See Anton-Giulio Manganelli, Cartel Pricing Dynamics, Price Wars, and
Cartel Breakdown, 19–20 (Toulouse School of Economics, Research Group:
Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Working Paper No. 12-309, 2012),
available at http://www.tse-fr.eu/images/doc/wp/bee/wp_tse_309.pdf [http://perma
.cc/JUN4-CX7F] (archived Mar. 16, 2014).
141. See Matthew Philips, Falling U.S. Oil Imports Will Reshape The World
Crude Market, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.business
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prices.146 Even when abiding by OPEC production limits, Nigeria
and Angola are now finding themselves with a surplus of oil,147
which creates an incentive to compete against fellow OPEC
Member Algeria in order to gain a foothold into the Chinese market.
This is one of the primary weaknesses of cartels: individual
members may attempt to garner a larger share of the market and
earn larger profits by undercutting the cartel itself. Once cartel
members begin competing against each other, the cartel agreement
has the potential to be completely undermined by sellers who may
attempt to quickly capture a large share of the market by discounting
their price.148
CONCLUSION
It is unclear whether the meteoric expansion of U.S. oil
production will result in the end of OPEC’s role as an unconstrained
cartel with stranglehold on the global economy or merely result in a
temporary decrease in stature—not a “cause for worry,” as stated by
one OPEC delegate.149 Currently, it appears that individual Member
Nations’ reactions to coming market fluctuations will determine
whether economic changes leave OPEC a cartel in name only.
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